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Background: The retrospective diagnosis of Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoyevsky’s (1821–1881) neurological and
psychiatric disease proves to be particularly interesting. Recent neurobiological data suggest a solution to the
questions regarding the writer’s retrospective diagnosis, claiming the insular cortex to be the origin of the rare ecstatic
seizures. Regarding Dostoyevsky’s pathological gambling, this hypothesis is consistent with another ﬁnding from
recent neuroscience, namely that the malfunction of the insula could be an important underlying pathology in
gambling disorder. Case study: Literary and scientiﬁc overview (1928–2015) on the subjects of Dostoyevsky’s
epilepsy and gambling disorder. Discussion and conclusion: Taking Dostoyevsky’s neurological (ecstatic seizures)
and psychiatric (pathological gambling) disease and the crossroads into consideration, these two disciplines make
regarding the underlying pathology, we would like to suggest a speculative theory that these two disorders have a
common insular pathomechanism, namely, the malfunctioning of the risk prediction–risk prediction error coding
system. Furthermore, based on Dostoyevsky’s case, regarding gambling disorder in general, we would like to
hypothesize that the three common gambling-related cognitive distortions (near-miss effect, gambler’s fallacy, and
the illusion of control) can be all attributed to the impairment of the anterior insular risk prediction–risk prediction
error coding system.
Keywords: gambling disorder, gambling-related cognitive distortions, risk prediction–risk prediction error coding
system, illness of Dostoyevsky, ecstatic seizure
BACKGROUND
Re-evaluation of famous individuals’ illnesses in the light of
recent neurobiological research data has been a great chal-
lenge for medical pathobiographists. The retrospective diag-
nosis of Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoyevsky’s (1821–1881)
neurological and psychiatric disease proves to be particularly
interesting. While the Russian writer’s retrospective diagno-
sis of epilepsy is well known, the gambling disorder accom-
panying him throughout his life is not as widely known.
Although the retrospective diagnosis regarding the type of the
writer’s epilepsy has been raising serious arguments among
epileptologists since the 1960s, recent neurobiological data
suggest a solution to these questions claiming the
insular cortex to be the origin of the seizures. Regarding
Dostoyevsky’s pathological gambling, this hypothesis is
consistent with another ﬁnding from recent neuroscience,
namely that the malfunction of the insula could be an
important underlying pathology in gambling disorder.
METHODS
We performed a literary and scientiﬁc overview (1928–
2015) on the subjects of Dostoyevsky’s epilepsy and
gambling disorder, as well as cognitive distortions in
gambling disorder. The following search terms were
used in the database of PubMed: “Dostoyevsky epilepsy,”
“Dostoyevsky gambling,” “Dostoyevsky illness,” “ecstatic
seizure,” “Dostoyevsky seizure,” “Dostoyevsky psychopa-
thology,” “Dostoyevsky psychiatric disorder,” “gambling
cognitive distortion,” “gambling near-miss,” “near-miss
insula,” “gambler’s fallacy,” and “gambling illusion of
control.” Twenty-ﬁve articles and ﬁve books were identiﬁed
and included in this study.
CASE PRESENTATION
The aspect of epilepsy
The ecstatic aura. The reason why Dostoyevsky’s epilepsy
brought up retrospective differential diagnostic questions is
the subject of the so-called “ecstatic aura”: a type of simple
partial seizure – ﬁrst described by Moritz Heinrich Romberg
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in the nineteenth century – Dostoyevsky experienced
besides his grand mal seizures (Tényi et al., 2014). Descrip-
tions by the Russian writer himself of ecstatic aura are
available in his friends’memoirs and the central character in
his novel The Idiot, Prince Myshkin, who suffers from
epilepsy, also giving a detailed description of this phenom-
enon. His close friend Nikolay Strakhov quoted a detailed
description of these ecstatic seizures of Dostoyevsky:
“for several brief moments I feel a contentedness which
is unthinkable under normal conditions, and unimagin-
able for those who have not experienced it. At such times
I am in perfect harmony with myself and with the entire
universe. Perception is so clear and so agreeable that one
would give ten years of his life, and perhaps all of it, for a
few seconds of such bliss.” (Gastaut, 1978, p. 188.)
The most well-known description of an ecstatic aura is from
Prince Myshkin:
“All his agitation, all his doubts and worries, seemed
composed in a twinkling, culminating in a great calm,
full of serene and harmonious joy and hope full of
understanding and the knowledge of the ﬁnal cause
[ : : : ] What does it matter that it is an abnormal tension
if the result of the moment of sensation, remembered and
analyzed in a state of health, turns out to be harmony and
beauty brought to their highest point of perfection, and
gives a feeling, undivined and undreamt of till then of
completeness, proportion, reconciliation, and an ecstatic
and prayerful fusion in the highest synthesis of life?”
(Dostoevsky, 1977, p. 258., translated by Magarshack)
As shown in the above paragraphs, these seizures are
characterized by increased awareness (of self and environ-
ment), increased conﬁdence, and extreme joy accompanied
by a feeling of numinosity.
Scientiﬁc debate about Dostoyevsky’s epilepsy. It is no
wonder that this extremely rare and strange manifestation
of epilepsy brought up questions – even arguments regard-
ing the possibility of its existence. Freud interpreted
Dostoyevsky’s grand mal seizures as hystero-epilepsy
(Freud, 1945). Building his psychoanalytical hypothesis on
the – since queried – fact that the Russian writer had his ﬁrst
seizure after his father’s death. This traditional psychoanalyt-
ical interpretation could be easily proven to be wrong by
examining the seizure semiology. In 1963, Alajouanine
interpreted Dostoyevsky’s epilepsy as temporal lobe epilep-
sy, the presence of ecstatic aura being his most important
argument (Alajouanine, 1963). Gastaut determinedly denied
the existence of ecstatic aura – claiming it to be only the fruits
of an extremely talented and creative mind – and denied
the retrospective diagnosis of partial epilepsy (Gastaut, 1978).
It was an interesting turn when Cirignotta, Todesco, and
Lugaresi (1980) ﬁrst registered ictal temporal discharge on
electroencephalogram (EEG) in a patient with ecstatic aura,
conﬁrming the temporal lobe as the symptomatic zone – thus
ending the 20-year-long scientiﬁc debate. Based on this new
evidence of the existence of an epileptic ecstatic aura, a
consensus formed about Dostoyevsky’s epilepsy and his
ecstatic seizures being of temporal lobe origin (Baumann,
Novikov, Regard, & Siegel, 2005; Hughes, 2005; Rayport,
Rayport, & Schell, 2011; Rice, 1985; Rossetti, 2006; Sene-
viratne, 2010). This localization hypothesis has been consid-
ered as valid for almost 30 years although in the light of
recent data it has been strongly queried.
Recent neurobiological ﬁndings. Insular risk prediction–
risk prediction error coding system. The temporal lobe
hypothesis established by Cirignotta et al. (1980) was
recently confuted. The new theory was based upon a
28-year-old patient’s case who had been suffering from
psychomotor epilepsy since the age of 3, ecstatic auras
preceding the complex partial seizures. Fused single-photon
emission computed tomography (SPECT) +MRI images
were obtained and showed hyperactivation in the left ante-
rior insular cortex during an ecstatic seizure. Fortifying this
ﬁnding with subdural EEG recordings led to a new hypoth-
esis: malfunction of the insular cortex could be the under-
lying cause of ecstatic seizures (Landtblom, Lindehammar,
Karlsson, & Craig, 2011).
In this regard, two newly discovered insular functions have
to be mentioned that provide further fortiﬁcation for the insular
theory. It has been proposed that parts of the insular cortex
have fundamental role in ﬁrst, self-awareness, and second, the
risk prediction–risk prediction error coding system.
In a three step insular model, Picard and Craig (2009)
summarize the role of the insula in self-awareness develop-
ment: (1) the posterior insular cortex supplies the perception of
the whole body; (2) this perception’s re-representation then
takes place in the mid-insula; (3) ﬁnally, receiving signals from
the mid-insula and the limbic structures, the anterior insula
plays the mean role in whole-body-perception as well as
emotional perception and integration.
The recently discovered risk prediction–risk prediction
error coding system located in the anterior insula plays an
important role in perceiving and processing risk prediction
and risk prediction error. Regarding all events that could
happen even with the slightest possibility, the brain predicts
the most probable outcome. If the outcome matches the
prediction, the prediction was correct and no prediction error
obtains (Picard, 2013). However, when the prediction and the
outcome are different, prediction error occurs. The adequate
perception of prediction error has an important role in
adaptation because representing the occurring prediction
errors toward the other cortical areas is an important basis
of adaptation: it helps not to make the same risk prediction
mistakes again. This hypothesis is fortiﬁed by the neuroim-
aging investigations by Preuschoff, Quartz, and Bossaerts
(2008) who detected two signals in bilateral anterior insula
during a simple gambling task: one reﬂecting risk prediction
and other reﬂecting risk prediction error. Asking the healthy
participant to guess a card’s value, risk prediction rose
indicated by the activation of the rostral part of the anterior
insula on functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI).
Revealing the card’s value (when the outcome did not match
the prediction), risk prediction error occurred indicated by the
activation of the caudal part of the anterior insula (Preuschoff
et al., 2008). These two signals were separated not only in
space but also in time – giving evidence for the existence of
the risk prediction–risk prediction error coding system.
In view of these two newly recognized insular functions,
two main symptoms of ecstatic aura can be explained. On
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the one hand, ictal hyperactivity of the self-awareness
coding system results in increased self-awareness, phenom-
enon patients usually mention to be the characteristic of
ecstatic auras (Picard & Craig, 2009). On the other hand,
increased conﬁdence, another important symptom, can be
attributed to the ictal malfunction of the prediction error
coding system (Tényi et al., 2014). Taking all recent data
into consideration, there is growing evidence that epileptic
malfunction of the insular cortex could be responsible for
ecstatic auras after all.
The aspect of gambling disorder
Gambling disorder of Dostoyevsky. Transpassing to the
psychiatric aspects of Dostoyevsky’s pathology gambling
disorder has to be taken into consideration. The Russian
novelist struggled with pathological gambling nearly
throughout his adult life: his biography researchers usually
refer to the fact that he lost all his money on roulette several
times. Interesting literary historical fact that one of his
famous short novels, The Gambler (a story, inspired by his
own gambling addiction), was written under strict pressure
in order to be able to pay off his gambling debt. The well-
known gambling disorder-related pathological cognitive
and behavioral patterns can be recognized in the following
letter written to his brother by Dostoyevsky:
“ : : : in Wiesbaden I invented a system, actually tried it
out, and immediately won 1,000 francs. The next day I
got excited and departed from the system and immedi-
ately lost. In the evening I returned to the strict letter of
the system again and soon won 3,000 francs again
without difﬁculty. [ : : : ] And then to cap it all I arrived
in Baden, went to the tables, and within a quarter of
an hour I won 600 francs. This whetted my appetite.
Suddenly I started to lose, couldn’t control myself
and lost everything. After that I wrote to you from Baden,
took my last money, and went to play. Starting with 4
napoleons in won 35 napoléons in half an hour. I was
carried away by this unusual good fortune and I risked all
35 napoleons and lost them all.” (Jones, 1991, p. xvi)
The proven role of the insula in gambling disorder.
Gambling disorder (previously referred to as pathological
gambling and classiﬁed as “Impulse-Control Disorders Not
Elsewhere Classiﬁed” in DSM-IV) has recently been reclas-
siﬁed in the DSM-5 under the subsection of “Non-
substance-related disorders” in the category of “Addictions
and Related Disorders.” This reclassiﬁcation can be attrib-
uted to the signiﬁcant amount of growing evidence that
gambling disorder has similarities to substance use disorders
in many levels (i.e., genetics, neurochemical and neurobio-
logical mechanisms, clinical characteristics, and treatment
response). In a review published in 2010, van Holst, van den
Brink, Veltman, and Goudriaan (2010) identiﬁed four im-
portant cognitive–emotional processes that initiate and
maintain addictive behavior, especially focusing on gam-
bling disorder: (a) reward and punishment processing,
(b) impulsivity, (c) attentional bias and cue reactivity, and
(d) decision-making and executive function. The insular
cortex was identiﬁed among the underlying causes in two
out of four processes: attentional bias and cue reactivity and
decision-making and executive function.
Analyzing reward and punishment processing, patients
with gambling disorder (as well as patients with substance
use disorder) have lower sensitivity for reward, thus they are
more susceptible for initiating reward seeking behavior (van
Holst et al., 2010). This theory is consistent with the fMRI
ﬁndings that showed lower ventral striatal and ventromedial
prefrontal cortex activity during monetary gains in patho-
logical gamblers compared to controls (Reuter et al., 2005).
Regarding punishment processing, patients with gambling
disorder are considered to have diminished sensitivity to
punishment, creating the risk for poor choices through
insufﬁcient feedback (van Holst et al., 2010).
Regarding impulsivity, neurocognitive studies indicated
that the process of ignoring irrelevant information and
inhibiting irrelevant behaviors is impaired in patients with
gambling disorder (Goudriaan, Oosterlaan, de Beurs, & van
den Brink, 2004). Impulsivity playing an important role in
initiating and maintaining gambling behavior is fortiﬁed by
the high comorbidity of attention deﬁcit hyperactivity dis-
order with pathological gambling.
Cue reactivity in patients with gambling disorder was
also analyzed with neuroimaging; however, the results of
the different fMRI studies are inconsistent. Although not
analyzing patients with gambling disorder, an interesting
study pointed out the role of the insula in drug urges and
craving: patients with damage to the insular cortex were
more likely to manage to go through a disruption of smoking
addiction (Naqvi, Rudrauf, Damasio, & Bechara, 2007).
This interesting ﬁnding raises the hypothesis of the insular
cortex playing a sufﬁcient part in craving and drug urge,
maintaining addictive behavior.
Regarding the role of the insula in gambling disorder, the
processes of decision-making and executive function are the
most relevant. As the Iowa Gambling Test indicates,
patients with gambling disorder ignore long-term conse-
quences to obtain fast short-term gratiﬁcation – in other
words, they are “myopic for the future” (Bechara, Dolan, &
Hindes, 2002). In patients with gambling disorder, impaired
decision-making is attributed to three main cognitive dis-
tortions: the “near-miss effect,” the “gambler’s fallacy,” and
the “illusion of control.” Insular involvement in all of these
three cognitive impairments has been indicated in separate
neuroimaging and lesion-control investigations.
The ﬁrst distorted construct is the “near-miss effect,” a
belief that the outcome of “almost winning” is closer to
winning than losing. This effect can be best demonstrated
with the slot machine game, in which case – after pressing the
“start” button – win occurs when three identical ﬁgures show
up in the same row (i.e., apple–apple–apple). However, a
result with “apple–apple–orange” does not win, the patient
with gambling disorder do not identify it as a pure loss but
claims it to be closer to winning. The results of neuroimaging
studies gave explanation to the near-miss effect showing that
near-misses show overlapping activation with wins in the
bilateral insula, ventral striatum, and medial prefrontal cortex
in patients with gambling disorder (Chase & Clark, 2010;
Clark, Lawrence, Astley-Jones, & Gray, 2009; Dymond
et al., 2014). The second cognitive distortion that is com-
monly observable in gambling disorder is the “gambler’s
544 | Journal of Behavioral Addictions 5(3), pp. 542–547 (2016)
Tényi et al.
fallacy” (also known as Monte Carlo fallacy): a belief that the
chance of an outcome (e.g., heads or tails) is not independent
from the previous outcomes but rather depends on them. For
example in the case of playing heads or tails, after a row of 34
heads (which is statistically rare but can happen), the gambler
thinks that the outcome of the next throw will more likely be
tails than heads (however, the next outcome’s chance is still
ﬁfty-ﬁfty percent theoretically). In a lesion-control study
Clark, Studer, Bruss, Tranel, and Bechara (2014) found that
patients with damage to the insular cortex (n= 8) are no
longer susceptible to the “gambler’s fallacy” and the “near-
miss effect” – giving evidence that the insula may be the
underlying pathology in these cognitive distortions. The third
cognitive distortion patients with gambling disorder are more
susceptible to the “illusion of control”: the misbelief that
personal participation in the gambling process has a positive
effect on the outcome. The belief of the signiﬁcant positive
effect of pressing the “start” button personally rather than
leaving it up to a computer is commonly observable in slot
machine players. Signiﬁcantly enhanced connectivity be-
tween the insula and the ventral striatum was detected in
the “illusion of control” contrast during gambling in an fMRI
investigation (van Holst, Chase, & Clark, 2014). The authors
hypothesized excessive insular recruitment during illusion of
control to be a risk factor in maintaining gambling behavior.
DISCUSSION
There is a long-recognized association between epilepsy and
compulsive behavior: it has been previously described that
they tend to be co-occurring disorders. Seizure-evoking
irritative lesions of the temporal and frontal lobes were
described to possess the ability to elicit compulsive behavior
(Bartolomeil et al., 2002; George & Greenberg, 1997;
Kaplan, 2010). In an article discussing the epilepsy and
gambling behavior of Dostoyevsky, Hughes (2005) con-
cluded that this common ground-sharing comorbidity could
be applied to the Russian writer’s case as well; however, he
did not propose a detailed hypothesis about the exact
pathomechanism. Based on our ﬁndings regarding the
ecstatic seizures and the pathological gambling of
Dostoyevsky, we raise the speculative hypothesis that these
two disorders shared common pathomechanistic ground,
namely, the malfunctioning of the insular risk prediction
and risk prediction error coding system.
Based on the neuroimaging and lesion-control studies,
the three impaired cognitive processes can all be connected
to the malfunction of the insular cortex. Although the
neuroimaging investigations mostly indicate excessive in-
sular recruitment, the exact pathomechanism underlying
these cognitive distortions is still unknown. We would like
to raise the speculative hypothesis that the three cognitive
distortions observed in gambling disorder (near-miss effect,
gambler’s fallacy, and the illusion of control) are the results
of the impaired functioning of the insular risk prediction–
risk prediction error coding system (Table 1). Near-misses
showing overlapping recruitment with wins can be inter-
preted as the impaired functioning of the prediction error
coding system, failing to issue an appropriate error signal
when losing: that is why the patient interprets near-miss an
entity being closer to “win” than to “loss.” On the other
hand, “gambler’s fallacy” and the “illusion of control” can
be attributed to the malfunction of the risk prediction coding
system. Both the irrational misbelief that an outcome of a
single event is dependent on the previous outcomes
(gambler’s fallacy) and the cognitive distortion that personal
involvement is beneﬁcial in a chance situation (the illusion
of control) can be interpreted as impaired risk assessment
(Table 1).
Table 1. Gambling-related cognitive distortions and insular functioning
Evidence Hypothesis
Role of
insula Study Nature of study Finding
Insula
pathomechanism
Near-miss
effect
Clark et al.
(2009)
Functional
neuroimaging
Near-misses recruited insular
circuitry and this activity
correlated with gambling
propensity.
Dymond et al.
(2014)
Functional
neuroimaging
Near-misses recruited similar brain
regions to wins, including the
insular cortex.
Proven Dymond et al.
(2014)
Magneto-
encephalography
Increased theta oscillations to near-
misses were measured in the
insula.
Impaired functioning of
the risk prediction
error coding system.
Clark et al.
(2014)
Lesion control Damaged to the insula abolished
motivation to play after near-
misses in slot machine task.
Gamble’s
fallacy
Proven Clark et al.
(2014)
Lesion control Gambler’s fallacy, measured by
roulette task, was disrupted in
patients with insula damage.
Impaired functioning of
the risk prediction
error coding system.
Illusion of
control
Proven van Holst et al.
(2014)
Functional
neuroimaging
Insular connectivity correlated with
gambling severity in the illusion of
control contrast.
Impaired functioning of
the risk prediction
error coding system.
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Although the retrospective diagnoses of both Dostoyevs-
ky’s gambling disorder and epilepsy are widely accepted
assumptions in the literature, due to the nature of this topic,
EEG, neuroimaging, and thorough psychiatric evaluation
data are not available for assessment. Even though after
careful consideration of these certain limitations, in our
opinion, proposal of these speculative hypotheses could
serve to be relevant and useful in the light of Dostoyevsky’s
medical pathobiographic evaluation, as well as the clinical
management of the two discussed disorders.
CONCLUSION
Taking Dostoyevsky’s neurological (ecstatic seizures) and
psychiatric (pathological gambling) disease and the cross-
roads into consideration, these two disciplines make regard-
ing the underlying pathology, we would like to suggest a
speculative theory that these two disorders have a common
insular pathomechanism, namely, the malfunctioning of the
risk prediction–risk prediction error coding system. Further-
more, regarding gambling disorder, we would like to hypoth-
esize that the three common gambling-related cognitive
distortions can be all attributed to the impairment of the
anterior insular risk prediction–risk prediction error coding
system. We would like to point out that the Russian novelist’s
story is an instructive example how a medical pathobio-
graphic case could provide further evidence to the recent
fast-developing neuroscientiﬁc researching methods.
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